Behavioral contagion (BC) is defined as the mimic and adopt of others’ preferences after observing. This type of contagion has crucial role in changing behaviors of the individuals and groups. Our fMRI task-based study had been organized to understand about this phenomenon. Our task was developed on the basis of Dictator Game (DG) which is a behavioral economic paradigm. The task had three sessions, before, observation and after. During the three sessions, the participants were scanned for fMRI. In behavioral analysis we found some participants had shown BC after observing others’ preferences but some hadn’t. In this part of the study, we have tried to find the reasons for this difference between the Contagion and No-Contagion groups. To this end, the adjacency matrices of the two groups were compared in the resting state, session 1 and session 2. There was no significant difference between the adjacency matrices of the groups in the resting state. No significant difference was found when comparing sessions 1 either. However, in session 2, two completely different patterns were observed for the Contagion and No-Contagion groups. It is interesting to note that the pattern of No-Contagion group showed fourteen reduced connectivity, with most of the resources located in different layers of the frontal gyrus. The pattern of the Contagion group showed eight increased connectivity with different resources. We believe that these results provide a good insight into behavioral contagion and could prepare a predictor for the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of behavioral contagion in individuals.

There are wide ranges of evidence show that self-interest is not unique motivation in various Games and experiments. Fairness, reciprocity, competition and altruism can take substantial role in some Game. To explain contrary result of experiments some models arise by considering those motivations beside the selfishness. This study explores three types of these models. Two of them are based on fairness and last one supposes that subjects are surplus maximizer. A distributional experiment based on Dictator Game is established to explore models. Results show fairness motivation has main rule in subject’ s choice in all treatments. However it is impossible to ignore self-interest and efficiency entirely.

Economic analysis is usually based on the assumption that individuals seek to maximize personal or individual interest. There are, however, evidence and phenomena in some of the economic experiments that cannot be interpreted and explained solely on the basis of personal interest. To explain contrary result of experiments some models arise by considering those motivations beside the selfishness such as fairness, reciprocity and altruism. Three types of these models are introduced in this paper. The first and second models are based on fairness and inequality aversions. In the third model, it is assumed that individuals maximize total payoff. To test the validity of models, a two person distributional experiment is designed in the form of a Dictator Game. The test was performed for two groups of students. The results show that a significant proportion of individuals choose fairness outcome versus self-interest, in the expense of own payoff. To evaluate the robustness of result, the experiment was repeated for another group, with the difference that this time, if the fair one is chosen, not only will the person receive less money, but also the total surplus reduces. Nevertheless a significant proportion of people choose a fair option.

The term "Game GIS” implies to real spatially enabled Games in which a special part of the world is virtually simulated, represented and managed. In fact, Game GIS is an integrated system consists of video Games and geographical information systems, aimed to simulate and representing spatially enabled environment. The achieved result of implementing a Game GIS service can be exploited before a crisis for wise designing of a city and diminution of the aftermath casualties. As the decision making process plays the key role to reduce the losses, the need arises for using the models as much as close to the reality. By this, it is possible to use the virtual world in in the form of a Game rather than experiencing the real world with real wounded and killed persons in. This enables us to recognize and manage a test environment for promoting the managing the real environment of a city during and before a natural hazard disaster like an earthquake.  ...

Dental diseases in children have high prevalence the purpose of this study was to assess the effectiveness of oral health Game on brushing skill and plaque score of school children. A Quasi-experimental study was carried on 220 subjects randomly and sampling was done on the fourth grade's girl students. A checklist was used to measuring the brushing skill and plaque score. t. test showed that there is a significant statistical difference between two groups brushing skill (P= 0.000) and plaque score (P= 0.000). The effectiveness of oral health Game was 96.9% in brushing skill and the plaque score to 14.7%.  

Introduction: Behavior contagion in social decision-making refers to the alignment of an individual’s behavior and decisions with those of others in social interactions. Despite previous studies in the field, it remains necessary to understand how brain activities are spatiotemporally organized during contagion. Since brain activities include both positive and negative fluctuations, monitoring these occurrences in a polar space using a visibility graph (VG) can aid in a better understanding of this phenomenon. Methods: We subjected a healthy group to a psycho-economic task while their EEG was simultaneously recorded. The participants’ performances were compared before and after observation of others’ preferences in a Dictator Game task. Subsequently, two groups were differentiated based on their behavior contagion rate. Then, the VGs of event-related potentials (ERPs) in both contagion and non-contagion groups were compared before and after observation.  Results: Our results indicated that the VG features differentially change in various EEG channels. For instance, changes in clustering coefficient, modularity, and efficiency of VGs suggested that the number of ERP components varies after contagion, specifically at the frontal, frontocentral, centroparietal, and parietal regions.  Conclusion: This result may raise questions about the ERP analysis of contagion, particularly when using the same number and length of components (e.g. P300) for comparing ERPs before and after contagion.

Objective: The Game theory attempts to model math behavior in a strategic situation. This situation occurs when the success of one side of the Game depends on the strategies that the other party chooses. The purpose of this study is to find an optimal strategy for the interests of the parties in the Game using the Game theory approach. Methods: The present study uses managers and auditors to maximize their profits, respectively, from profit management strategies and increasing the quality of the audit (reducing the risk of uncritical discovery). The statistical population of the study is a statistical society that is accessible to all companies admitted to the stock market by imposing restrictions on the years 1391 to 1395. Hypotheses for the combined data of 116 companies (575 companies of the year) were tested using the best responder response and the Mann-Whitney test. Results: Research findings reveal the existence of “ Nash equilibrium” in the strategy of high audit quality strategy and high earning management, therefore in this strategy, neither the auditor nor the manager has the incentive to change the strategy because they will reduce their interests by changing their strategy, Because they will reduce their interests by changing their strategy. Conclusion: The results of the research indicate that it is important to consider the audit as a type of strategic environment. The findings of this research can help auditors in analyzing conflicts with the client and selecting the optimal strategy in the audit process.